



RECONVICTION IN FAIR TRIAL SATISFIES DUE
PROCESS AND BARS A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS FOR ILLEGAL SEARCH
AND SEIZURE AND UNFAIR TRIAL
Plaintiff had been convicted of a felony in a state court and sentenced
to the state penitentiary for a period of ten to twenty-five years. After
more than three years imprisonment he was granted a new trial pursuant
to a state statute' which affords relief to any person incarcerated after
proceedings which violated his federal or state constitutional rights.2 In
a second trial he was again convicted and sentenced to a term of three
to fifteen years. The plaintiff thereupon brought suit under the Federal
Civil Rights Acts 3 against the police officers who had arrested him to
recover damages for deprivations of his constitutional rights because of
an illegal search and seizure and the imprisonment suffered as a result of
the unfair trial. He alleged that the trial was unfair since the fruits of the
illegal search had been admitted into evidence and since one of the defend-
ants had perjured himself.4 The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action on
the ground that every guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment had been
afforded to the plaintiff inasmuch as he had been reconvicted in a fair
proceeding and had suffered no additional imprisonment as a result of
the first trial. Jennings v. Nester, 217 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 888 (1955).
The Civil Rights Acts were enacted as the sword of th6 Civil War
Amendments primarily to protect the Negroes' newly won freedoms from
hostile state actions, but, because of a series of restrictive judicial deci-
sions, their purview has never been clear.3 The acts provide equitable
1. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, §§ 826-32 (Supp. 1954).
2. See Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951); People v. Jennings, 411 Ill.
21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952).
3. R-v. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952).
4. The plaintiff's additional allegations that he had been deprived of due process
and equal protection of the laws by the state's attorneys who prosecuted him in the
first trial and by conspiracies of the attorneys and police officers were dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action. The prosecuting attorneys were held immune
to civil suit on the basis of Cawley v. Warren, 216 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1954). But cf.
Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945); see Notes, 68 HAav.
L. REv. 1229 (1955), 46 COL. L. REv. 614 (1946). The conspiracy charges were
dismissed since the plaintiff failed to allege a denial of the equal protection of laws
or of privileges and immunities as required. REv. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1952). See generally Note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (1953).
5. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicH.
L. REv. 1323 (1952).
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and compensatory relief, in addition to criminal sanctions,0 against any-
one who, under color of law, deprives another of any rights arid privileges
secured by the Constitution. The plaintiff in the instant case alleged two
distinct causes of action under these acts: the illegal search and seizure
and the unfair trial. While the Supreme Court has not held that an
illegal search and seizure is a violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,7 strong dicta to that effect exist. In Wolf v.
Colorado,8 while a majority of the Court held that the admission of
illegally obtained evidence in a state prosecution does not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment,9 the dictum of Justice Frankfurter that an individual's
right to privacy is a basic liberty which is protected against arbitrary
intrusion by the state through the due process clause was unanimously
supported. 10  This position was reaffirmed in Steffanelli v. Minard 11 and
in Irvine v. California 12 in which two Justices suggested immediate crim-
inal prosecution under the Civil Rights Acts of the state police officers
who perpetrated the illegal search and seizure.' 3 While the instant court
did not consider illegal search and seizure as a deprivation apart from the
unfair trial, it is doubtful that it would reject without discussion the stated
view of the Supreme Court. Assuming therefore that the court in the
instant case accepts the Wolf dictum that an illegal search and seizure con-
stitutes a due process violation, it is difficult to comprehend how this
deprivation could be "cured" by the second trial, for it occurred prior to
and independent of the first trial. Once the illegal search and seizure has
taken place, it would seem that an aggrieved person has a cause of action
regardless of whether or not he is ever brought to trial. The fact that
the evidence thus obtained is introduced in a trial may perhaps be one of
the determinants of the extent of the compensable injury, but a trial is not
an element of the deprivation.
It is not clear that the alleged deprivation in the initial trial itself can
be cured by a subsequent fair trial even where the plaintiff apparently has
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-44 (1952). Sections 241 and 242 parallel the civil sections
and are to be construed pari inuteria. Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240
(3d Cir. 1945).
7. Cf. National Safe Deposit Co. v. Illinois, 232 U.S. 58, 71 (1914); United
States ex rel. Rooney v. Ragen, 173 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
961 (1949). For the history and development of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, see Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-
A Second Class Constitutional Right, 25 IND. L.J. 259, 262-77 (1950).
8. 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ; cf. Hague v. CIO, 101 F.2d 774, 781 (3d Cir.), modified
and aff'd, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (The court of appeals granted an injunction
under the Civil Rights Acts against search and seizure, but the Supreme Court,
without deciding the constitutional issue, held that there were not sufficient findings
of fact to warrant the decree.).
9. But cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
10. 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
11. 342 U.S. 117 (1951) (action under Civil Rights Acts to enjoin the use
of illegally seized evidence was dismissed on the ground that a court of equity
should refuse to decide issues which would interfere with state judicial proceedings)
cf. Erickson v. Hogan, 94 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
12. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
13. Id. at 137-38.
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suffered no additional imprisonment. A cause of action for violation of the
due process clause consists of two basic elements: a denial of due process
and a deprivation of life, liberty, or property following therefrom. The
first trial constituted the former; the three years' loss of liberty before
retrial is thought to provide the latter. However, it may be reasoned that
the plaintiff was not deprived of his freedom by the first trial since the
sentence in the second trial not only exceeded, but gave credit for, the time
already spent in prison. Thus, it can be argued that the original depriva-
tion of liberty was obviated by the retroactive "cure" of the second trial,
leaving the cause of action lacking an essential element. Yet, whether or
not the plaintiff was rightfully in prison, he was at least deprived of his
freedom without due process until he had a fair process for the deter-
mination of his guilt; 14 therefore, reconviction in the second trial would
seem only to limit the extent of his injury. Moreovei,, the court's assump-
tion that he suffered no additional punishment because the sentence in the
second trial exceeded and gave credit for the time already spent in prison
is not necessarily valid. It fails to consider that a fair trial three years
earlier might have produced a lesser sentence since the lapsed time may
have affected many relevant factors such as the accuracy of witnesses'
memories and the availability of proof.'6  Additional considerations may
be found in an analysis of policy favoring or disfavoring allowing persons
such as plaintiff to bring suit under the Civil Rights Acts. If the cause of
action accruing from the first trial can be cancelled by a reconviction in
which the sentence equals or exceeds the time spent in prison between
trials, there would be an unhealthy atmosphere for the dispensation of
justice in the retrial. The state officers, facing possible prosecution and
liability under the acts, would be encouraged to employ any means to
exculpate themselves by securing reconviction. This danger, however, may
be minimized by the close judicial scrutiny which would, no doubt, ac-
company the new trial. On the other hand, there is the possibility that
the acceptance of a doctrine of "cure" would encourage prosecutors or
other state officials to disclose violations which otherwise might be left
unrevealed where disclosure could lead to liability of state officers in a
federal suit. The instant court relied on analysis which would apply to
anyone bringing a civil suit under the Acts, but is not particularly per-
tinent to the problem of the effect of granting or denying a cause of action
in situations like the instant case. The reasoning that this suit would
serve only to discipline state police officers 16 is patently weak inasmuch
14. Under the traditional view, the right to due process in a criminal trial is
a guarantee of a fair proceeding rather than of a just result. See Stroble v. Cali-
fornia, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952) ; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137 (1934)
(dissenting opinion). For the effect of Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953),
on this concept compare Gorfinkel, The Fourteenth Aiendment and State Criminal
Proceedings, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 672 (1953), with Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952
Term, 67 HARv. L. REv. 91, 120 (1953).
15. The effects of the time lapse are so speculative, however, that they should
not be considered in determining damages.
16. Instant case at 155.
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as it is through the imposition of sanctions on state officers that individual
liberties are protected. The civil remedy provides a means of enforce-
ment which complements the criminal sanctions wielded by a small divi-
sion of the Justice Department which is inadequate to handle all invasions
of individual rights.17 The argument that state remedies provide a satis-
factory alternative which makes this type of suit unnecessary 18 ignores
another fundamental precept of the acts: that it is vital to allow the in-
dividual recourse to a forum not so susceptible to local pressures and
prejudices.19  It may further be inferred from the opinion that the
court feared that to permit these suits would open the flood gates of litiga-
tion which would upset the state-federal balance. This point likewise
seems without foundation since it appears that the number of such suits
would not be substantial. The measure of damages may be limited to the
expenses incurred in proctiring and defending the second trial,2 1 for, except
in cases of extreme injustice, juries do not award large recoveries or puni-
tive damages to convicted criminals. 2 It is not likely then that plaintiffs
will sue to recover where the amount of their recovery would be approxi-
mately the same as the non-taxable costs of the civil suit.3 Thus, it would
seem that to allow recovery in these situations would further the purposes
of the legislation while dismissal of this suit on the basis of "cure" may
serve only to confuse further the scope of the Civil Rights Acts by in-
troducing subtle distinctions into the concept of due process without any
apparent offsetting advantages.
In utilizing the "cure" doctrine in the instant case the court not only
failed to meet the search and seizure issue, but it avoided a much simpler
disposition of the cause of action based upon the unfair trial. The holding
of the Wolf case would dispose of the allegation that the introduction of
evidence illegally seized by a state officer is a violation of a constitutional
right. In addition, the perjury count could have been dismissed on the
ground that such conduct did not deprive plaintiff of due process. While
the Supreme Court has held that the knowing use of perjured testimony
17. See Putzel, Federal Civil Rights Eitforcementt: A Current Appraisal, 99
U. oF PA. L. t~v. 439 (1951).
18. Instant case at 155.
19. See Gressman, supra note 5, at 1323-27.
20. For a discussion of the import of the state-federal balance with respect to
the Civil Rights Acts, see Steffanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951) ; Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
21. Developntents in the Law-Dauages, 61 -ARv. L. REv. 113, 135 (1947);
McCoRmICK, DAMAGFS §§ 66, 67 (1935).
22. See Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 25 COL. L. REv. 11, 22-23 (1925).
23. The expenses of the damage suit are virtually unrecoverable in the federal
jurisdiction. -See Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878) ; McCoRmicx, DAMAGES
§§ 61, 85 (1935). Although the value of these expenses may be recovered indirectly
through punitive damages, they may not be used as a measure of such damages. Day
v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851); McCox-NacK, DAMAGES §85
(1935). But cf. Schlein v. Smith, 160 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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by a state prosecuting attorney would deny petitioner due process,24 per-
jury in itself has not been held to be a constitutional deprivation.5 Thus,
it would seem that the perjurer in the instant case could not be held liable
under the Civil Rights Acts since he did not subject the plaintiff to a denial
of any constitutional right. This fact limits the situations where it would
be necessary to consider the effect of a corrective retrial since most of the
parties who would be responsible for denying due process in a trial have
been held immune from suit.2 6  However, the issue may well arise with
respect to other state officers against whom an action will lie,2 7 and the
law is not so settled that it is unrealistic to speculate on the validity of
granting immunity from civil actions based on unfair trials to prosecuting
attorneys 2 8
Criminal Law-
ACTS NOT FORMERLY CRIMINAL AT COMMON LAW
HELD PUNISHABLE AS INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC MORALS
Defendant made repeated telephone calls to a married woman in which
he used obscene language and suggested intercourse and sodomy. On the
assumption that Pennsylvania has no statute defining this behavior as
criminal, and despite the fact that there was no previous case which held
such acts to be a crime at common law, defendant was convicted for
"Immoral Practices and Conduct." The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed on the ground that the acts of defendant were injurious to public
morals and hence a misdemeanor at common law. Commonwealth v.
Mochan, 110 A.2d 788 (Pa. Super. 1955).
The common law of crimes is incorporated in the Penal Code of Penn-
sylvania 1 and has been the basis of a number of decisions upholding con-
victions for offenses not expressly made criminal by statute. Some of
these cases involve offenses specifically indictable at common law 2 Where
no exact precedent was found, the courts have affirmed convictions on the
ground that any offense "injurious to the public morals" is indictable at
24. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935).
25. United States v. Spadafora, 200 F2d 140 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Hinley v. Bur-
ford, 183 F2d 581 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Tilghman v. Hunter, 167 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.
1948); Wagner v. Hunter, 161 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1947); Hedge v. Huff, 140
F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1944); United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y.
1951). But see Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938).
26. See note 4 supra.
27. E.g., McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949) (constable
responsible for selecting prejudicial jury).
28. See note 4 supra.
1. PA. STAT. AN' . tit. 18, §5101 (Purdon 1945).
2. Commonwealth v. Mohn, 52 Pa. 243 (1866) (common scold); Commonwealth
ex rel. Swisher v. Ashe, 145 Pa. Super. 454, 21 A.2d 479 (1941) (attempted larceny).
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common law.3 The employment of this doctrine in the instant case would
appear unnecessary since defendant's conduct seems to come within the
statutory prohibition against solicitation to commit sodomy.4 Even in
the absence of this statute, resort to the doctrine may not have been needed
inasmuch as sodomy is a felony 5 and any solicitation to commit a felony
is a common law misdemeanor. 6 Nevertheless, the indictment was drawn
on neither of these bases, and both counsel agreed that if the defendant
had committed any criminal offense it must come within the common
law prohibition against acts "injurious to the public morals." The case
was heard and decided on this assumption.
While it is true that the common law is part of the law of the Com-
monwealth, it can be argued that the statutory provision which retains
common-law offenses was meant only to preserve previously defined com-
mon-law crimes and not to permit its extension to uncharted fields.7 But
even if this is not so, today, it is the legislature rather than the judiciary
which is primarily concerned with defining reprehensible conduct; 8 there-
fore, as a matter of inter-governmental harmony, the instant court might
have reversed the conviction in order to avoid impinging upon the legis-
lative domain.9 Moreover, in view of the fact that defendant might have
been indicted under the statutory provision for solicitation of sodomy, the
court by reversing would discourage the use of broadly drawn indictments
by prosecutors to punish conduct which strikes them as anti-social. But
a more compelling reason for reversal of the instant case would seem to
lie in the Fourteenth Amendment which has been interpreted as requiring
3. Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397 (1881) ; Commonwealth v. Sharpless,
2 S. & R. 91 (Pa. 1815) ; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Binn. 277 (Pa. 1811) ; Common-
wealth v. Orris, 136 Pa. Super. 137, 7 A.2d 88 (1939) ; Commonwealth v. DeGrange,
97 Pa. Super. 181 (1929); Commonwealth v. Miller, 94 Pa. Super. 499 (1928);
Commonwealth v. Sherman, 72 Pa. D. & C. 66 (Erie C.P. 1950) ; Commonwealth
v. Glenny, 54 Pa. D. & C. 633 (Erie Q.S. 1945). But cf, Commonwealth v. Rupp,
47 Pa. D. & C. 302 (Allegheny Q.S. 1941).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4502 (Purdon 1945) "Whoever unlawfully and
maliciously, assaults another with intent to commit sodomy, or solicit, and incites
another to permit and suffer such person to commit sodomy with him or her, is
guilty of a felony. . . ." See Commonwealth v. Schaller, 72 Pa. D. & C. 459
(Mercer Q.S. 1950).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4501 (Purdon 1945).
6. Commonwealth v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 83, 23 Atl. 388 (1892); The King v.
Higgins, 2 East 5 (K.B. 1801); Commonwealth v. Imschweiler, 33 Pa. D. & C.
593 (Berks Q.S. 1938).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5101 (1945) provides: "Every offense now punish-
able either by the statute or common law of this Commonwealth and not specifically
provided for by this act, shall continue to be an offense punishable as heretofore."
(italics added) Much the same language appeared in § 178 of the Act of 1860.
Pa. Laws 1860, No. 374, at 425. It would seem clear from the language of the
section that conduct formerly criminal at common law is to continue as such; but
if the legislature intended to permit the common law to grow there would be no
necessity for this savings clause.
8. Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, and Texas have recently abolished common-law crimes. While other
states have retained the common law, it would seem that it is playing an increasingly
less important role in punishing new conduct.
9. This is the tenor of the dissenting opinion. Instant case at 791.
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that behavior which is made criminal must be clearly defined.' 0 t In Musser
v. Utah 1 the validity of a state statute which made it a crime ". .. to
commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade
or commerce . was challenged on the ground of vagueness. The
case was remanded to the Supreme Court of Utah for a determination of
whether, in light of the law of that state, a sufficiently clear standard ex-
isted.12 The state court found no such standard and declared the statute
unconstitutional. 18 The vice of a vague standard is found in its ex post
facto nature, for its meaning is not clear until interpreted by the court
after the commission of the act.14  Apparently, the question of whether a
common-law standard must avoid the constitutional prohibition against
vagueness has never been raised; 15 but the same policy applies whether
the standard had its inception in the legislature or in the judiciary, for in
either case the defendant would not be apprized of the criminal nature of
his acts until after a judicial determination. To the extent that prior
litigation has produced a standard by which conduct can be measured,
there is no problem of vagueness. However, in light of the Pennsylvania
courts' application of the standard of "injurious to public morals" to varied
and unrelated misconduct,' 6 there is no reason to assume that a more clearly
defined standard exists in Pennsylvania than that -of the unconstitutional
Musser statute. Nor does the fact that a sufficient standard existed to
convict the defendant on other bases change the result, for in Musser the
defendants might have been indicted under another section of the criminal
code which did have a sufficiently clear standard.17 If it is felt necessary
to punish conduct which formerly was not deemed criminal, the legislature
would seem to be the only governmental branch which can so act in order
to insure that criminal conduct is expressly and clearly defined. If this
results in the original offender escaping punishment, it is the unavoidable
10. State v. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193 (1950); see also Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) and cases cited id. at 453 n2; Commonwealth
v. Franklin, 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952) and cases cited therein.
11. 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
12. The constitutional question was raised by inquiries from the bench during
argument and the case was remanded to permit the Supreme Court of Utah to pass
on the question. Id. at 98.
13. State v. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193 (1950).
14. See Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948) ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926); Williams v. United States, 179 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1950), Of'd, 341
U.S. 70 (1951); 62 H-Av. L. Rnv. 77 (1948); 23 IND. L.J. 272 (1948).
15. -Indeed, in the usual case involving vagueness, a well defined common-law
standard is used to save an otherwise vague statute. See, e.g., United States v.
Brandenburg, 144 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1944).
The following writings have commented on the vice of a vague common-law
standard. WILLIAMS,- CRIMINAL LAW 455 (1953); ALI MODEL PENAL CODE 107
(Tent. Draft No. 4 1955) ; Note, 47 COL., L. Rzv. 1332, 1335, 1337 (1947).
16. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
17. UTAH CODS ANN. § 103-11-1 (1943) made it unlawful for two or more
persons to conspire to commit a crime. UTAH CODE ANN. § 103-51-1 (1943) made
polygamy a crime. Therefore, the defendants in Mwrser might have been indicted
for conspiring to commit polygamy.
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consequence of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legisla-
tion. In the future, a court in determining whether to extend the common
law of crimes to new conduct might well consider the quasi-legislative
nature of such an extension and the policy against vagueness embodied
in the constitutional limitation of legislative acts.
Evidence-
LABELED CAN WITH REGISTERED TRADEMARK
NOT ADMISSIBLE WITHOUT AUTHENTICATION
Plaintiff was injured when a piece of metal contained in a can of peas
lodged in her throat. The can, which had been purchased from a local
store in Maine, had some numbers impressed upon it and a label on which
defendant's name and trademark were printed. The labeled can was
offered in evidence to show that defendant, a corporation located in Min-
nesota, had distributed the peas. Defendant's objection to the admission
of the can without authentication was sustained, and the trial court directed
a verdict for the defendant on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. On
appeal, the supreme court affirmed, holding that the can with the label
was not admissible without extrinsic evidence which would connect de-
fendant to the can. Keegan v. Green Giant Co., 110 A.2d 599 (Me. 1954).
In order to prevent fraud and forgery the courts have required that
there must be some extrinsic evidence of the authenticity of a writing or
object before it can go to the jury.' This rule has been applied, for ex-
ample, in cases involving the submission in evidence of documents such as
letters,2 telegrams,3 advertisements, 4 receipts6 and objects such as bottles,
burglar tools,7 and guns.8 However, some exceptions to this rule can be
found in cases where the writing or object is held self-authenticating be-
cause of the low probability that it was forged or imitated.9 Thus, a reply
1. 7 WIG oRE, EViDExCE §§ 2129, 2130, 2148 (3d ed. 1940).
2. See, e.g., McGowan v. Armour, 248 Fed. 676 (8th Cir. 1918); Burgess v.
Simmons, 207 Ga. 718, 61 S.E.2d 410 (1950); Horn v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 114,
81 S.W.2d 576 (1935).
3. See, e.g., McLellan v. Threlkeld, 279 Ky. 114, 129 S.W.2d 977 (1939); Lund-
gren v. Union Indemnity Co., 171 Minn. 122, 213 N.W. 553 (1927); Cobb v. Glenn
Broom & Lumber Co., 57 W. Va. 49, 49 S.E. 1005 (1905).
4. See, e.g., Mancari v. F. P. Smith, Inc., 114 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; Lochner
v. Silver Sales Service, Inc., 232 N.C. 70, 59 S.E.2d 218 (1950); Lindsey v. Com-
mercial Discount Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d 345, 55 P.2d 896 (1936).
5. Stephenson v. Grim, 100 Pa. 70 (1882).
6. Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 193 S.C. 51, 7 S.E.2d 641 (1940).
7. People v. Fontana, 356 Ill. 461, 190 N.E. 910 (1934).
8. People v. Muhly, 11 Cal. App. 129, 104 Pac. 466 (1909).
9. State ex rel. Kunz v. Woodmansee, 156 Ore. 607, 69 P.2d 298 (1937) (reply
letter) ; Peterman v. Vermont Savings Bank, 181 La. 403, 159 So. 598 (1935) (reply
telegram) ; Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 208 Ala. 559, 94 So. 748 (1922) (reply
letter); Smith v. Lynn, 152 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (ancient document).
See McCoRmicx, EVIDENCE § 192 (1954).
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letter is self-authenticating since it is doubtful that persons other than the
purported sender would have had the familiarity of the contents of the
requesting letter necessary to write the reply.10 For the same reason
various state legislatures at times have extended this exception to other
types of documents 1" and objects.'2 The instant case is unusual in that
it is apparently the first time that the issue of the authenticity of a can
and its label has reached the appellate level.
The evidence in dispute in the instant case is relevant as tending to
show that the defendant is responsible for the contents of the can, and
particularly the piece of metal that injured the plaintiff. Analytically
merely authenticating the label on the can as being that of the defendant
would not seem to be sufficient since it might have been forged or, if
genuine, stolen and placed on a can other than defendant's. The vital link
in the chain of proof in a case such as this is the can itself, since its nature
makes tampering with its contents virtually impossible. Therefore, relating
the can to the defendant would also connect him with the contents. Thus
the case is distinguishable from one involving foreign matter in a bottle
where identification of the bottle as one of the defendant's is not conclusive
in light of the ease with which a bottle can be uncapped, emptied, refilled,
and recapped.' 3 However, a can without a label may be virtually impos-
sible to trace. While some packers impress numbers on their cans to
signify the year in which the can was packed, the particular crop from
which it came, or other pertinent information, 14 this practice is not universal
and many cans are completely unmarked. Moreover, if a packer sells to
a number of different distributors each of whom uses his own label, the
numbers on a can might identify the packer but not necessarily the dis-
tributor. Thus it would not aid in prosecuting a claim against the dis-
tributor as in the instant case. In addition, there is still the possibility that
someone, in an attempt to sell under the defendant's brand name, might
have copied the impressions on the can. Apparently, therefore, the easiest
and most certain method of authenticating the can would have been to trace
the can from the retail store where plaintiff purchased it back through the
chain of distribution to the defendant. Nevertheless, it seems that the ex-
pense involved in reconstructing that series of transactions is largely un-
necessary. While perhaps the label alone is insufficient analytically to
connect the defendant with the contents of the can, the probability that a
10. Marcotte's Estate v. Clay, 170 Kan. 189, 224 P.2d 998 (1950).
11. E.g., N.Y. LAws 1914, c. 113 (advertisement); ALA. CODE § 9270 (1923) (ad-
vertisement); N.Y. PRAC. MAN. §§ 384, 386 (Clevenger 1954) (deeds); Ium. ANN.
STAT. c. 30, §34 (1934).
12. E.g., W. VA. CoDE c. 47, art. 3, § 5 (1931) (bottle with trademark) ; NEV.
CoMp. LAws § 54-110 (1929) (animal brands).
13. See note 6 mpra.
14. Letter from Phillips Packing Co., to the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, May 20, 1955, on file Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law
School; letter from Samuel Zuckerman & Co., to the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, May 23, 1955, on file Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
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can bearing defendant's label is not defendant's is very slight. Most labels,
including the one in the instant case, contain a trademark registered under
a federal statute 15 that provides penalties for persons who infringe upon
trademarks of others by forgery,' and the theft of genuine labels to be used
on another's products would be larceny. In addition the cost and practical
difficulties encountered in such an infringement are deterrents that decrease
the likelihood of its occurring. If this is true, a more reasonable procedure
than that followed in the instant case would be to allow a can to come into
evidence, once it is shown that the label contains the defendant's trademark.
This would constitute prima facie evidence that the can and its contents
were processed under the aegis of the defendant who would have the burden
of going forward to show that he is not responsible for the can or its con-
tents. This procedure would be analogous to those cases involving letters
properly mailed where the party denying receipt must prove nonreceipt since
the known regularity of the mail makes it improbable that he did not
receive it,1 7 or cases where reply letters are held to be self-authenticating.1
8
Such a procedure would seem to be appropriate inasmuch as defendant has
registered his trademark to encourage the public to rely on his brand.' 9
It is increasingly important in view of the current expansion of tort lia-
bility, particularly in the area of foodstuiffs, to hold remote members of the
chain of distribution liable to the ultimate purchaser-consumer for in-
juries arising from defects in the product.20
Even if authentication is required, diligent counsel often will be able
to avoid the problem presented in the instant case. In some jurisdictions
counsel might serve a written request on his adversary for an admission of
the genuineness of the object.2 1 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure if the adversary unreasonably fails to make the admission, an order
of the court can be secured charging him with the expense of authenticat-
ing.22 In some jurisdictioris an admission can be obtained under the
statutory provisions at a pre-trial conference.2 If unable to secure an ad-
mission, counsel often will be able to authenticate the can and its contents
15. 60 STAT. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1952).
16. 60 STAT. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-20 (1952) (civil remedy).
17. Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Brantley, 231 Ala. 554, 165 So. 834 (1936). See
McCoR.MIcK, EVIDENCE § 309 (1954).
18. See note 10 supra.
19. See Robert, Commentary on the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 265,
268 (preceding § 1051) (1934).
20. See DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIAILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER (1951);
PROSSER, TORTS 673-93 (1941) ; Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other
Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937); Comments, 42 Ky. L.J.
273 (1954), 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 258 (1953).
21. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 231, § 69 (1933) ; N.Y. PRAC. MAN. § 322 (Clevenger
1954).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 36, 37(c).
23. Nims, PRE-TRIAL 35-58 (1950) (outlines procedure in various state and
federal courts).
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by taking depositions of persons in the chain of distribution upon written
interrogatories. 24 . If these procedures are not available or not used by
counsel the trial court should use its discretion to insure that the issue of
authentication is raised only when there is a reasonable belief as to the
falseness of the proffered evidence.25
Securities Exchange Act-
NO FEDERAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OR UNDER RULE X-10B-5 FOR
RIGHTS ENFORCEABLE AT COMMON LAW
Stockholders of the Algoma Coal and Coke Company instituted a
derivative action against the president of Algoma and against the directors
of other corporations, and the corporations themselves, with which the presi-
dent was associated. They alleged that the purchase of stock in these
corporations by Algoma through its president was part of a scheme to
defraud and to divert opportunities for business profits from Algoma,1 and
thus violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 2 and Rule
X-10B-5 - promulgated thereunder. The court treated defendants' motion
to dismiss as a motion to quash service of process which it sustained as
to those defendants who were served outside West Virginia, the state of
the forum.4 It held that since the complaint alleged a cause of action
cognizable at common law, it did not come within the purview of the
Securities Exchange Act and, in the absence of diversity of citizenship, was
enforceable only in a state court. Alternatively, the court held that in-
sofar as the stock purchases were concerned, the plaintiffs had not shown
24. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. C. 117, §§ 1-32 (1954). But § 20 provides that the court
may admit or reject depositions taken out of state.
25. 9 WIGMoRE, EVmENCE § 2597 (3d ed. 1940).
1. The complaint also alleges that the security purchases were accomplished by
deceptive devices and by use of the mails, and that defendant concealed the name
of the corporation whose stock was purchased, and misled the plaintiffs by stating
subsequent to the transaction that the stock acquired was worthless.
2. 48 STAT. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78j (1952) provides that: "It shall be un-
lawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce or of the mails, ...
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
. . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
3. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1949).
4. Fa. R. Civ. P. 4(f) provides that process may be served only within the
state of the forum except when a federal statute permits service beyond the terri-
torial limits of the state. If the action had come within the Securities Exchange Act,
service of process outside the forum would have been valid. See note 12 infra.
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iny damages which resulted from the alleged fraud of the individual de-
fendants. Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954).
4*
The Securities Exchange Act did not expressly cover the situation
where a person other than a dealer or broker purchased securities through
fraildulent means. In order to close this regulatory loophole, the Commis-
sion promulgated Rule X-10B-5 r which provided that:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ment made . . . not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
In a number of recent cases this rule has been interpreted as impliedly creat-
ing a civil remedy against its violator.6  While X-10B-5 has been held
applicable to transactions which are neither registered on a national secu-
rities exchange nor regularly traded over the counter, 7 its protection has
been said to extend only to a defrauded purchaser or seller.8 Substantively,
the rule is said to impose a new and more stringent standard of disclosure,9
and although the "fraud" contemplated by the rule remains undefined,' 0 it
is reasonable to assume that it is not limited to circumstances giving rise
to a common-law action for deceit." Because of X-10B-5's prohibition
4a. The circuit court dismissed an appeal from-the instant case on the ground
that the decree was interlocutory but noted in dictum that they did not agree with
the reasoning of the district judge. Beury v. Beury, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
90704 (4th Cir. May 9, 1955).
5. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942, 17 C.F.R.
§240.10b-5 (1949) ; Note, 52 MicH. L. REv. 893-94 (1954).
6. E.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (on motion to dismiss), 73
F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (on the merits), 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
(on request for additional findings) ; see Note, 61 H~Av. L. Rev. 858 (1948).
7. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Robinson v. Difford: 92 F.
Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950), 64 HARV. L. Rev. 1018 (1951).
8. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952). See also Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (requirement of "privity" between vendor and purchaser
of security), 4 STAN. L. Rev. 308 (1952).
9. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Note, 59
YALE L.J. 1120, 1122 n.18 (1950) (cases collected). See also Loss, SEcuaiu s
REGULATION 823-44 (1951).
10. Loss, op. cit. mpra note 9, at 817.
11. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77q(a)
(1952) has been held not limited to circumstances for which a common-law action
would lie. Charles H. Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
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against non-disclosure of a material fact as well as the liberal venue and
nation-wide service of process provisions of Section 27 of the act,12 it often
is advantageous for a plaintiff to institute suit in a federal court under the
Securities Exchange Act rather than to commence action in a state court
under a common-law theory of liability. Additionally, in an appropriate
case, the litigant may be aided by the SEC acting as amicus curiae.' 3 How-
ever, choice of forum is governed by Section 2714 which further provides
that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought
to enforce any duty or liability created by the act. The instant court in-
terpreted this provision to limit federal jurisdiction to those actions which
could not have been brought in state courts under the common law in
order to prevent withdrawal " . . . from the jurisdiction of the state
courts all actions for fraud wherein purchases or sales of securities might
be involved." 15 The court reasoned that, since a common-law remedy
was available for the fraud alleged,' 6 the Securities Exchange Act did not
create the liability and therefore concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over
the action.
Although the Securities Act of 1933 expressly gave the state courts
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce all liabilities arising thereunder,' 7 Con-
gress did not permit dual jurisdiction in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, but specifically provided 18 that the federal courts were to have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all actions brought under that act. It seems ap-
parent from this difference that by Section 27, Congress intended 9 only to
withhold from the state courts the power, granted in the Securities Act,
to interpret and enforce actions arising under the Securities Exchange Act,
321 U.S. 786 (1944). Since Rule X-10B-5 uses the identical language of § 17(a), it is
quite likely that the rule will be similarly interpreted. It is to be noted that the instant
court views the rule as providing rights of recovery which go beyond the common-
law remedies. Instant case at 790. See also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp.
808, 831-32 (D. Del. 1951) (rule not unconstitutionally vague even though not con-
fined to common law) ; Loss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 817 (fraud provisions of statute
in general not limited to circumstances giving rise to common-law action of deceit).
12. 48 STAT. 902 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1952) provides that "[a]ny suit or
action to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or rules and regulations
thereunder, . . . may be brought in any . . . district [where the act occurred]
or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts busi-
ness, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the
defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found."
13. The SEC has filed briefs as amicus curiae in several of the recent civil suits
brought under X-10B-5. See, e.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) ;
Robinson v. Difford, 92 F.,Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
14. 48 STAT. 902 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1952).
15. Instant case at 789.
16. See, e.g., BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATIoNs § 79 (rev. ed. 1946); 3 FLETcHER,
PRIvATE CORpORATioNs §§ 856, 1011 (rev. vol. 1947).
17. 48 STAT. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1952) provides that "[t]he district
courts of the United States . . . [shall have] concurrent [jurisdiction] with State
and Territorial Courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this subchapter."
18. 48 STAT. 902 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1952).
19. See 78 CONG. REc. 8099, 8571 (1934).
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and not to disturb their power to enforce common-law rights. Thus,
granting federal jurisdiction under X-10B-5 over a fact situation also ac-
tionable at common law would not disturb the states' jurisdiction to provide
a remedy for the alleged wrongs under a common-law theory of liability.
This result would be in harmony with Section 28 of the act 20 which ex-
pressly states that the remedies provided by the act are additional to, and
not intended to limit in any way, the ordinary state remedies. Recent
decisions,2 1 which have permitted a cause of action under the act and have
been based upon facts which would have been actionable at common law,
give added weight to the correctness of this interpretation.
The standard of the instant court would be difficult to apply and would
lead to varied results since the precise scope of common-law fraud is un-
clear and varies from state to state,22 and there may be doubt whether a
given set of facts would be actionable absent the act.P Under the instant
court's holding, a party might have his claim dismissed by a federal court
on the ground that there was a common-law remedy available, and then,
if the court refused to hear the common-law claim,2 4 discover in a subse-
quent suit brought in a state court that no common-law remedy could be
granted. Thereupon, plaintiff would again have to bring suit in the fed-
eral court and suffer additional costs and delay. Moreover, there is the
possibility that further action might be barred by a statute of limitations.2
20. 48 STAT. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1952).
21. E.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 635 (9th Cir. 1953); Robinson v.
Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950); cf. American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 295
N.Y. 36, 64 N.E2d 347 (1945) (federal jurisdiction held exclusive over action arising
out of alleged wrongs actionable only under act).
22. Loss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 812-16.
23. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952), 100 U. OF PA. L. RE;. 1251, 1254 n.21 (1953).
24. Under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, since the same fact situation
which was alleged to support an averment of a violation of X-10B-5 would support a
state claim, the federal court may retain jurisdiction and decide the state claim even
though the federal claim is found without merit. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238
(1932) ; Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COL. L. Rv.
157, 165-69 (1953). But if the federal claim was dismissed, as in the instant case, at
the motion stage and consequently has not proceeded to trial, it is not an abuse of
discretion to dismiss the state claim. Massachusetts Universalist Convention v.
Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950) ; see Strachman v. Palmer, 177
F.2d 427, 431, 433-34 (1st Cir. 1949) (concurring opinion); Note, 46 ILL. L. REv.
646 (1951). However, in such a case, the district court may decide to retain juris-
diction in order to prevent the occurrence of the situation posed in the text.
25. It is not clear whether a stockholder's derivative suit to recover damages
for the corporation would be governed by the federal doctrine of laches or the statute
of limitations in the state in which the wrongful act occurred. It has been held that
a private cause of action under X-10B-5 brought by an individual is governed by
the state statute of limitations. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
However, at least one writer has stated that since a derivative action is equitable,
all such actions brought under X-10B-5 would be covered by laches. See Loss,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 1053-54; see also Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or
Holder of Slures in a Close Corporation under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAW & CON-
TiP. PRoB. 505, 533 (1953). However, it may be that only those derivative actions
which are traditionally equitable, such as an action for an accounting or an injunc-
tion Will be governed by laches and actions for damages which are traditionally legal
actions, even though derivative, will be governed by the state statute of limitations.
If not, then of course, laches would not bar the plaintiff since the delay in the pro-
ceedings was not of his making.
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The alternative holding of the instant court offers a- more logical
ground for dismissal of the present action.. Since the security purchases
do not appear to be related to or needed for the alleged scheme to divert
business opportunities from Algoma, -it seems apparent that the fraud
was not "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" and thus
did not meet the requirements of X-10B-5. A further reason for dismissal
might be drawn from dictum in a leading case which states that acts which
result in fraudulent mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty are wrongs
not meant to come within the purview of X-10B-5, 20 This would cover the
facts in the instant case.
Zoning-
ORDINANCE PERMITTING REVOCATION OF
NONCONFORMING USES BY ZONING
COMMISSION UPHELD
Plaintiff received a building permit and constructed a concrete-mixing
plant which he began to operate in compliance with all air pollution regu-
lations. Two months later an ordinance was passed which rezoned the
area as a light manufacturing district and thereby made plaintiff's plant a
nonconforming use. Under the ordinance, nonconforming uses -of im-
proved property similar to plaintiff's were given twenty years to dis-
continue,1 but these uses were revocable at any time the Regional Planning
Commission should determine after public hearing that they were "so
exercised as to be detrimental to the public health or safety, or so as to
be a nuisance," 2 or upon determination that the uses could be altered to
conform to the zoning ordinance "without impairing any person's consti-
tutional rights." 3 Several months after passage of the ordinance the com-
mission found that plaintiff's plant was a nuisance and detrimental to
26. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463-64 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), 100 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 1251, 1254 (1953). See
also Loss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 824; Note, 61 I-Iv. L. REv. 858, 866 (1948).
1. 1927 Los ANGELES COUNTY BASIC ZONING ORDINANCE No. 1494, § 531. This
Ordinance is incorporated by reference into 1950 Los ANGELES URGENCY ORDINANCE
No. 5508. Under § 531, unimproved property is given one year to exist; unim-
proved except for structures, the replacement of which does not require a building
permit, three years; all other cases, twenty to sixty years in relation to a detailed
table based on depreciation of various types of property.
2. 1927 Los ANGELES COUNTY BASIC ZONING ORDINANCE No. 1494, § 649(e).
Id. §§649(a)-(d) provides for revocation of a nonconforming use granted either
automatically or by other approval on the following grounds: fraud in obtaining
approval; not exercising use for which approval was granted; cessation or suspension
of use for one or more years; exercising use contrary to the terms or conditions
of such approval, or in violation of any statute, ordinance, law or regulation.
3. Id. § 533: "In addition to other grounds stated in . . . [§ 649], an exception
which has been automatically granted may be revoked if the Commission finds:
(a) That the condition of the improvements, if any, on the property are
such that to require the property to be used only for those uses permitted in the
zone where it is located would not impair the constitutional rights of any person.
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public health, and ordered it discontinued at the end of one year.4 Plain-
tiff obtained a decree in the county court enjoining enforcement of the
commission's order. The appellate court affirmed on a finding that the
provisions granting the commission power to revoke nonconforming uses
were a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights under federal and state
due process clausesO The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding
that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power and that plain-
tiff's only remedy was by certiorari or mandamus to determine whether
there had been a proper hearing and any evidence to support the commis-
sion's order. Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los Angeles,
272 P.2d 4 (Cal. 1954) (4-3).
Nonconforming uses have been granted constitutional protection by the
courts consistently in order to prevent hardship to property owners who
had no reason to suspect that, because of zoning enactments, their utiliza-
tion of property would become unlawful." A general exception to this
protection is found in those cases upholding ordinances where the legis-
lature prohibited the continuance of a class of existing uses on nuisance
theories. Although a few courts have required that the prohibited class
of existing uses be nuisances per se,1 most courts, including those of
California, merely require a reasonable legislative basis for finding that the
uses within the class are or will become nuisances in fact.8 However, in
Louisiana an ordinance ordering a nonconforming drug store and a grocery
store in a residential district to be discontinued in one year was upheld in
the Dema Realty Company cases 9 on- the theory that any nonconforming
(b) That the nature of the improvements are such that they can be altered
so as to be used in conformity with the uses permitted in the zone in which
such property is located without impairing the constitutional rights of any
person."
4. The record of the Regional Planning Commission was not placed in evidence.
5. Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 260 P.2d 811 (Dist.
Ct. App. Cal. 1953) (sections 533 and 649 were declared unconstitutional as ap-
plicable to the plaintiff).
6. Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930). See BAssET, ZONING
105 (1936) (cases collected) ; YOxiLE, ZONING LAW AND Pa.cnrcE 362-63 (2d ed.
1953).
7. Wolarz v. Cuyahoga Heights, 53 Ohio App. 161, 4 N.E.2d 400 (1936); Simon
v. Cleveland Heights, 46 Ohio App. 234, 188 N.E. 308 (1933); Manos v. Seattle,
173 Wash. 662, 24 P.2d 91 (1933). The term "nuisance per se" is not susceptible
to precise definition since its meaning varies in different jurisdictions. However,
generally it is defined as "an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all
times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings, while a
nuisance in fact is . . . an act, occupation, or structure not a nuisance per se,
but one which may become a nuisance by reason of circumstances, location, or sur-
roundings." Denney v. United States, E85 F.2d 108, 110 (10th Cir. 1950).
8. E.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), affirming 165 Cal. 416,
132 Pac. 584 (1913) (brick yard); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915)
(livery stable); accord, Oklahoma City v. Dolese, 48 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1931)
(coal and gravel business in light manufacturing area not a nuisance) ; Terrace Park
v. Errett, 12 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1926) (gravel yard in residential area not a nuisance).
See discussion in Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COL. L. REv. 457,
460-70 (1941).
9. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert.
denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929) ; State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752,
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use was a nuisance. As the problem of the nonconforming use has become
more prevalent, 10 a second approach has been taken by a small but increas-
ing number of legislative enactments which provide for the discontinuance
of nonconforming uses after a definite number of years."- These amortiza-
tion ordinances have been recognized by writers on the subject as both
constitutional and fair on the theory that the monopolistic position enjoyed
by the nonconforming property owner will permit him to regain his capital
investment and that he has a definite period in which to arrange to relocate
his business.12 A third approach to the elimination of nonconforming uses
was attempted through an ordinance of an Ohio municipality giving the
local council power to terminate those nonconforming uses which had been
permitted to exist for a "reasonable time." It was held in Akron v. Chap-
man ' 3 that this general ordinance was a deprivation of property without
due process when applied through a special ordinance to a junkyard which
had been a nonconforming use for over twenty-five years and had been
ordered to be vacated on only one year's notice. Although the junkyard
had existed more than a sufficient length of time to enable the property
owner to regain his capital investment, the ordinances did not provide for a
definite amortization period in which the owner could arrange for the re-
location of his business, and, furthermore, as the concurring opinion
pointed out, there was no indication that the ordinance would be applied
against any other individual. The California ordinance in the instant case
is unique in that it is apparently the first ordinance in which a zoning com-
mission has been empowered to decide that an existing use is a nuisance for
the purpose of revoking the use. Specifically, the ordinance combines an
amortization approach with this nuisance revocation provision and a pro-
vision which in operation may be similar to the ordinance invalidated in
Akron v. Chapman; various types of nonconforming uses may exist for
definite periods of time,'4 but any specific use may be revoked whenever
the commission finds it to be a nuisance 15 or whenever it can be altered to
conform to the use of the zone "without impairing any person's constitu-
tional rights."' 6
123 So. 314 (1929). For criticism of the Dema Realty Company cases, see Fordham,
Local Planning and Zoning, 6 LA. L. REv. 495, 506-07 (1946); Comment, 1951
Wis. L. Rlv. 685, 691-92; Note, 35 VA. L. Rav. 348, 354 (1949).
10. Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 40 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1954); Notes,
102 U. OF PA. L. R-v. 91 (1953), 9 T. OF CH. L. REv. 477, 479 (1942).
11. See enabling acts collected in Comment, 1951 Wis. L. Rav. 685, 691 n.29;
Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P2d 34, 41 n.3 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1954).
12. See authorities cited in Comment, 1951 Wis. L. Ray. 685, 691 n.28; Note, 102
U. OF PA. L. REV. 91, 101 (1953). The only decision directly sustaining anortiza-
tion legislation prior to the instant case appears to be Standard Oil Co. v. Talla-
hassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950). Cf. Edmonds
v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 642, 255 P.2d 772 (1953) ; Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d
34 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1954).
13. 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E2d 697, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1283 (1953).
14. See note 1 supra.
15. See note 2 supra.
16. See note 3 upra.
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In the instant case the zoning commission exercised its power to de-
termine that an existing condition constitutes a nuisance. 17 This deter-
mination operated as a revocation of the amortization period to which the
owner of the nonconforming concrete-mixing plant otherwise would have
been entitled under the ordinance. Before the adoption of this ordinance,
a determination on the issue of nuisance would have been made by a court
of law or equity.'8 Under the provisions of the ordinance a new tribunal
is empowered to make this determination for the purposes of administering
the zoning laws. There seems to be little constitutional objection to the
validity of such an enactment, 19 but it appears likely that there will be
marked differences between the administration of the ordinance and the
judicial application of nuisance law. Hearings before the commission avoid
the necessity of private citizens incurring litigation expenses in orde" to
enjoin a nuisance; in addition, the technical distinctions between a public
and private nuisance will be less vital.2° However, serious disadvantages
to the individual property owners may accrue from the broad power given
to the commission. For example, one faced with an equity injunction pro-
ceeding can rely on the stringent proof requirements of these proceedings 2 '
and, even if these are met, can still prevent an absolute prohibition of his
activities by showing that his use can be modified so that it will no longer
be a nuisance.2 2  But when the commission is making the determination, a
property owner cannot risk an initial adverse decision because he may be
17. It is possible that plaintiff's nonconforming concrete-mixing plant was a
nuisance in fact under California precedents. See Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362,
18 P.2d 678 (1933) (nonconforming asphalt-mixing plant in light industrial zone
found a public nuisance because of odor, dust and noise) ; cf. Tuebner v. Cal. Street
R.R., 66 Cal. 171, 4 Pac. 1162 (1884). CAL. Cirv. CoDm § 3479 (1949) defines a
nuisance as "anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property . ... "
18. CAL. Crv. CoDS § 3501 (1949) (private nuisance). Id. §§3493-94 (1949)
(public nuisance). See McQueen v. Phelan, 4 Cal. App. 695, 88 Pac. 1099 (1907)
(abatement of nuisance by public officer).
19. The Federal Constitution does not prohibit a state from placing judicial power
in a non-judicial body. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541
(1908) ; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). But this may be
prohibited by the state constitution. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. III, § 1; id. art. VI, § 1.
The California court referring to § 1 of article VI of its state constitution stated,
"[T]he Legislature would be without authority to give judicial power to any general
state board or tribunal. Except for local purposes the section disposes of the whole
judicial power of the state and vests all of it in the courts expressly named therein,
leaving none at the disposal of the Legislature." Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v.
Pillsbury, 171 Cal. 319, 322, 153 Pac. 24, 26 (1915). Apparently, the exception for
local purposes mentioned above has been recognized by the California court: "There
is no longer any doubt that local boards may constitutionally be vested with authority
to make first instant decisions of questions of law and issues of fact." Dare v. Board
of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal.2d 790, 812, 136 P.2d 304, 316 (1943) (concurring
opinion). See, 2 HASTINGS L.J. 48, 51 (1951).
20. As a public nuisance includes that which is detrimental to public health and
safety (PaossER, ToRTs 566 (1941)) the alternative terms of the ordinance are ap-
parently broad enough to cover the main elements of public and private nuisance.
21. See id. at 589-90.
22. See Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co., 85 Cal. App. 388, 398, 259 Pac. 484,
488 (1927) ; McIntosh v. Brimmer, 68 Cal. App. 770, 784, 230 Pac. 203, 207 (1924).
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unable then to save his use by a showing of possible changes. Consequently
he must either accept such modifications as the commission may urge or
refuse and attack the commission's finding in court if it should decide his
use is a nuisance. The opinion in the instant case notes that such an attack
would be made by certiorari or mandamus. While it was indicated that
the scope of judicial review would require affirmance if there was "any
evidence" to support the commission,23 the court presumably did not in-
tend to alter the substantial evidence rule embodied in the California Code
of Civil Procedure.2 4 Perhaps the single greatest disadvantage in allowing
the zoning commission to have this power is the danger that a particular
commission, in order to encourage the particular type of development which
has received legislative approval within the area of the zone, might reach
the result of the Denm Realty Company cases by tending to consider every
nonconforming use as a nuisance. Analogy might be made to the power
which a municipality has to prohibit a described class of uses by legislative
fiat 2 5 While such a legislative prohibition may strike the property owner
whose existing use has not yet become a nuisance in fact as well as the
action of an overzealous commission, the political respect which an elected
body has for the rights of a class of property owners, all of whom bear
equally the impact of an ordinance forbidding their uses, is not present
when only one property owner's use is under consideration by the zoning
commission. On the other hand, a legislative prohibition of a class would
probably bar many uses which might have been allowed to continue under
a zoning enactment such as the ordinance in the instant case, at least until
the nonconforming use became noxious to its surroundings.
Problems similar to those arising under the nuisance revocation pro-
vision are presented by the commission's power to extend or revoke en-
tirely the statutory amortizaion period when a nonconforming use can be
altered to conform to the use of the zone without impairing the constitu-
tional rights of any person 2 6 Presumably, the theory behind enactment
of this provision was that a definite class amortization period cannot be
equitable to every property owner 27 The possible financial loss to the non-
conforming user is not so great as under the nuisance revocation provision
since this power is applicable only when his use can be altered to conform
to the use of the zone 28 Nevertheless, when a zoning commission has the
power to reduce the length of a permissive use, the main advantages of
amortization are jeopardized; there is no fixed period on which the prop-
23. Instant case at 9 (italics added).
24. CAl. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1094.5 (c) (1949) (mandamus); id. § 1074 (cer-
tiorari).
25. See notes 8 and 9 supra.
26. 1927 Los ANGELES COUNTY BASIC ZONING ORDINANCE No. 1494, § 532 per-
mits the extension of a use beyond the amortization period.
27. Appellants Brief, p. 15; Opening Brief for Appellants, pp. 27-28, Livingston
Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 260 P.2d 811 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal.
1953).
28. This provision apparently is applicable only when the use of the building,
not the building itself, is nonconforming or when the sfructure is movable.
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erty owner can rely, and the application of the ordinance will not neces-
sarily affect al members of a class impartially. Thus, like the power as-
sumed by the city council under the ordinance invalidated in Akron v.
Chapnn, the length of life of an existing use subject to the ordinance in
the instant case may depend, in fact, on when the commission believes
that the use has existed a reasonable time. Unlike the Akron ordinance,
however, in the instant case constitutional objections may have been met by
requiring procedural safeguards in the form of a public hearing 29 and
review by certiorari or mandamus.
29. While 1927 Los ANGELES CoUNTY BASIC ZONING ORDINANCE No. 1494,
§ 649 specifically requires a public hearing, it was conceded by County Counsel that
this is also a requirement under id. §533. Brief for Appellants, p. 15. Accord,
Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal2d 260, 269-71, 246 P.2d 656, 661-62 (1952);
cf. Simpson v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 271, 280, 253 P.2d 464, 470 (1953).
